

The Discourse of Brotherhood in Turkish Foreign Policy during the AK Party Era

AK Parti Döneminde Türk Dış Politikasında Kardeşlik Söylemi

İbrahim KARATAŞ^(*)

Abstract

This study analyzes why and for which countries the Turkish Foreign Ministry uses the word kardeş (brother) in its discourse, particularly during the AK Party (Justice and Development Party) era. The study reveals that if a country is Muslim or ethnically Turkic, it is called a brother country. Besides states, Muslim or Turkic minorities in other countries are included in the brotherhood category. On the other hand, non-Turkic and non-Muslim countries are described as a friend, an ally, or strategic partners. However, being a brother does not mean that Turkey has the best relations with a country. On the contrary, Turkey has better relations with non-brother countries as well. Yet, being a brother state means probable privileged status in relations. Besides elucidating the discourse in Turkish foreign policy, this study also tries to counter realist ideas that friendship is not possible in the world order, which is supposed to be anarchical. Besides literature review, interviews were made to write the article.

Keywords: Turkey, Foreign Policy, Discourse, Realism, International Relations.

Öz

Bu çalışma, özellikle AK Parti hükümetleri döneminde Türk Dışişleri Bakanlığının söyleminde geçen 'kardeş ülke' terimini neden ve hangi ülkeler için kullandığını analiz

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(*) Asst. Prof. Ph.D., Istinye University, Social Sciences Institute, Political Science and International Relations Department, ibratas@gmail.com

ORCID ID: <https://orcid.org/0000-0002-2125-1840>

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etmektedir. Çalışma, bir ülkenin Müslüman veya etnik olarak Türk olması durumunda, kardeş ülke olarak adlandırıldığını ortaya koyuyor. Türk Dışışleri, devletlerin yanı sıra diğer ülkelerdeki Müslüman ve/veya Türk azınlıkları da kardeşlik kategorisine sokmaktadır. Öte yandan, Türk ve/veya Müslüman olmayan ülkeler bir dost, müttefik veya stratejik ortak olarak tanımlanmaktadır. Ancak kardeş ülke olarak anılmak Türkiye'nin bir ülke ile en iyi ilişkilere sahip olduğu anlamına gelmemektedir. Aksine, Türkiye'nin kardeş olmayan ülkelerle de çok iyi ilişkileri bulunmaktadır. Ancak yine de kardeş devlet olmak ilişkilerde ayrıcalıklı olmaktır denilebilir. Bu çalışma, Türk dış politikasındaki söylemi aydınlatmanın yanı sıra, realistlerin anarşik farz ettiği dünya düzeninde dostluğun da mümkün olduğunu öne sürmektedir. Makalenin yazımı için literatür taramasının yanı sıra röportajlar da yapılmıştır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Türkiye, Dış Politika, Söylem, Realizm, Uluslararası İlişkiler.

Introduction

Unlike realist claims, all states have friends though the degree and nature of friendship change from relation to relation. While sometimes friendship is based on common interests, in other cases, the reason might be an ideology, ethnicity, a religion, and even a geographical proximity. Yet, a friend might later be an enemy, and *vice versa*. However, despite changes in relations, states form alliances during the war as well as peaceful times thanks to friendship. If the world were always anarchical as rationalist theories claim, the weak states would never survive. Conversely, there are small states with a 30.000 population. Therefore, it can be argued that friendship exists among states regardless of what brings them together. Friendship can be found in the activities of states as well as the discourse of politicians and official statements. For instance, if a statesman calls another state as a friend, an ally, or a strategic partner, this means that there is more or less some friendship and warm relations between the two states. On the contrary, for example, if there are terms such as 'thug state,' 'terrorism supporter,' 'autocrat,' 'authoritarian,' 'illegitimate government' and 'dictatorship' in an official speech, it means that the addressed states are non-friendly, hostile or enemy.

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This is the case for Turkey, too. Turkish state categorizes other states with different names. It has friends, allies, strategic partners, but also brothers. When the Turkish Foreign Ministry's press releases, social media accounts, and speeches of Turkish statesmen are analyzed, it can be seen that some countries are privileged by being called brother countries/states. For Turks, if a country's population is Turkic in origin or a state or community is Muslim, they are called brothers. This study analyzes why there is such a classification; whether the brotherly discourse is perpetual, and how it affects inter-state relations. Such an analysis is necessary not only to examine the discourse of Turkish foreign policy but also to learn whether words have a reflection in practice. Besides, the study tries to figure out to what extent Turkish foreign policy is compliant with realist views, which argue that states are in relentless seek of power and that there is no room for friendship in the world order.

Methodologically, besides the literature review, the Turkish Foreign Ministry's press releases that were published on its website between 2010 and 2020, Turkish and English versions of the Ministry's Twitter accounts, and incumbent Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu's Twitter account were analyzed. In other words, the focused era is the last ten years of Ak Party governments. Moreover, pre-Ak Party era was also examined through going over parliamentary archives in order to learn whether the discourse is specific to Ak Party governments. In addition, the official discourse of some other countries was also checked. Besides, a few anonymous Turkish diplomats were interviewed.

National Interests, Foreign Policy and Friendship

All countries pursue their different forms of national interests such as political, economic, military, environmental, ideological, and so on. This duty is commissioned to states, and ruling elites realize it on behalf of the country. According to Nuechterlein, "the national interest is the perceived

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needs and desires of one sovereign state in relation to other sovereign states comprising the external environment.”¹

Such interests can be vital, important, and sometimes sacrificial or required for survival. However, how states act in the world order to preserve and maximize their interests have always been a debate, and perhaps they are such debates that led to the emergence of international relations theories. According to realists, the world political system is anarchical, in which states, the main actors, try to maximize their power in order not to be the gait of others. In this way, realists argue, states become self-reliant and ensure self-help, and preserve their security and sovereignty. In line with realist theory, Morgenthau argues that “the counsel that we ought to subordinate our national interests to some other standard is unworthy of a nation great in human civilization.”² A nation which would take that counsel and act consistently on it would commit suicide and become the prey and victim of other nations which know how to take care of their interests.” In addition, Waltz claims that peace is ensured by the geometry of power in the international system, where states behave like billiard balls that have no social bonds.³ However, not all realists are rigid in their views. For instance, Wendt asserts that countries with similar identities and norms have social bonds and less likely to fight each other.⁴ For example, the US will not oppose a militarily strong Canada but see a strong Cuba as a threat. On the other hand, while liberalists have similar views about the

¹ Donald Nuechterlein, “National Interests and Foreign Policy: A Conceptual Framework for Analysis and Decision-Making,” *British Journal of International Studies* 2, No. 3 (1976): 247.

² Hans Morgenthau, “What Is the National Interest of the United States?”, *The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 282, No. 1 (1952): 4. doi:10.1177/000271625228200102.

³ Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Politic*, (London: McGraw-Hill, 1979), 97.

⁴ Alexander Wendt, “Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction Of Power Politics,” *International Organization* 46, No. 2 (1992): 397.

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world order, they argue that cooperation between states is possible and it paves the way for peace.

To maximize their (inter)national interests, countries develop policies, literally called foreign policy. As briefly stated above, rational theories argue that foreign policy is based on power relations and aims to defend national interests. To them, there is no morality as states are like monsters waiting for an opportunity to eliminate others. Yet, this study does not agree with this idea and asserts that there can be friendship between states. How should friendship be defined then? Berenskoetter and Van Hoef say that “international friendship is a particular relationship of mutually agreed role identities embedded in a strong cognitive, normative and emotional bond revolving around a shared idea of order.”⁵ If there is a friendship between two states, they will have reciprocal privileges; there will be a positive discrimination among others; friends will support each other, and so on. Yet, as almost everyone may agree, international friendship is not like the one between individuals. Once Mikhail Gorbachev had said the relationship between states does not resemble schoolmates’ friendship.⁶ As another example, Lord Palmerston, then British Prime Minister, said in 1848 that “we have no eternal allies, and we have no perpetual enemies. Our interests are eternal and perpetual, and those interests it is our duty to follow in.”⁷

However, it is almost impossible to remove beliefs and mental frames when giving a decision. Like other people, leaders have beliefs and norms, according to which they define friends and foes. Politicians might be

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⁵ Felix Berenskoetter and Yuri Van Hoef, “Friendship and Foreign Policy, in Cameron Thies, *Oxford Encyclopedia of Foreign Policy Analysis* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), 1.

⁶ Jim Heintz, “Gorbachev Recalls A Friend Who “Loved Life,” *The Boston Globe*, 7 June 2004, http://www.boston.com/news/nation/articles/2004/06/07/gorbachev_recalls_a_friend_who_loved_life/?camp=pm (Accessed 26 November 2020).

⁷ Susan Ratcliffe, *Oxford Essential Quotations* (4 ed.) (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016).

people of faith, those acting according to their ideology, or caring about their ethnic identities. All these specifications have nothing to do with materialism, as beliefs are rather spiritual. For instance, the relationship between Hitler and Mussolini cannot only be reduced to materialism but the fascist view. This is why they allied during the Second World War. In addition, solidarity among socialist states was mostly ideological. However, it is still not wrong to say that countries seek their interests even in an ideological relationship. What brings them together might be a common worldview, but they do not stop seeking their national interests, e.g., De Gaulle's decision to withdraw France from NATO's military command. On the other hand, whether common goals make states friends, or the other way round is a matter of debate. Sometimes short and long-term interests make states friends and/or allies to each other. For example, though the Western Bloc and the Soviet Union were ideologically far from each other, they allied against Nazi Germany until the enemy was defeated. Yet, the enmity resumed as soon as the war was over. On the other hand, the US and the UK have long been friends due to various reasons such as common interests, ideological proximity, being in the Western hemisphere, and so on. Belonging to the same ethnic group or religion make also states friends. However, regardless of mental, moral, ideological, religious, or interest-based reasons, no friendship is eternal. Particularly when foreign ends are clashing, so do states.

Friendship is disclosed via the discourse of statesmen. Discourse is particularly a significant topic in social theory associated with Foucault and Althusser.⁸ Foucault links language with power in society and argues that it is the discourse that constitutes social beliefs and identities while, for Althusser, discourse is linked with class struggle.⁹ Moreover, in the international relations discipline, scholars of the Copenhagen School attach

⁸ Henrik Larsen, *Foreign Policy and Discourse Analysis*, (London: Routledge, 1997), 14.

⁹ Michel Foucault, *The Archaeology of Knowledge* (London: Routledge, 1989).

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importance to the discourse by arguing that security threats depend on a discursive mechanism.¹⁰ According to Buzan, Waever and de Wilde, who developed the concept of securitization, when a political figure securitizes an issue through discourse (speech act) by arguing that the issue is a threat to state security, and convince the audience about it, then the issue becomes a security matter.¹¹ The keyword in their conceptualization is the discourse, which changes the nature of a non-security issue into a security one. Saraçoğlu and Demirkol argue that the discourse used in foreign policy is supposed to be an extension of official state ideology, which is different than that of political parties.¹² For them, while party ideologies are populist, flexible, and pragmatic, state ideology is more stable, general, and rigid. However, parties and even leaders have the potential to turn down a state's ideological nature. Sometimes a leader or a party can change the basic tenets of a state's foreign policy. For example, Donald Trump hardly sticks to traditional American foreign policy. Moreover, as can be seen in Turkey, Ak Party changed the pro-Western and pro-status quo character of Turkish foreign policy and followed a maverick and more assertive paradigm in inter-state relations. Particularly status quo is no longer a principle. As will be discussed below, even discourse changed totally as per the new foreign policy.

To what extent discourse reflects real feelings and views of a state may not be measured but it still gives an idea about the relations between

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¹⁰ Sebastien Loisel, "Discourse Analysis and Foreign Policy Analysis: Introducing Speech Act Theory in European Foreign and Security Policy," *ECPR*, 2005, <https://ecpr.eu/Filestore/PaperProposal/7b869f2f-5431-417d-b313-1b9b2a8beec8.pdf> (Accessed 7 November 2020).

¹¹ Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver and Jaap de Wilde, *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*. Boulder, (Colorado: Lynne Rienner, 1998).

¹² Cenk Saraçoğlu and Özhan Demirkol, "Nationalism and Foreign Policy Discourse in Turkey under the AKP Rule: Geography, History and National Identity," *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies* 42, No. 3 (2015): 302, DOI: 10.1080/13530194.2014.947152.

countries. A state may call the other an ally, a strategic partner, friend, or even brother. Allies form alliances, which are defined as “formal associations of states for the use (or non-use) of military force, intended for either the security or the aggrandizement of their members, against specific other states.”¹³ The term refers mainly to military cooperation. Moreover, in a strategic partnership, two states intertwine their resources in a certain area for mutual benefits. The partnership might be political, economic, fiscal, military, or a combination of all. On the other hand, a friend is a close state with warm relations, like-mindedness, similar worldviews, and ideologies. Friends are privileged, closer, first among all, partners, allies, and the ones that accompany you in good and bad days. Finally, unlike all other terms, brotherhood means a deeper, permanent, barely changing, and altruist friendship. Friends, allies, or partners might change but brotherhood is supposed to be perpetual. Brotherhood in foreign policy mainly originates from ethnicity or religion. However, as history shows, brotherhood is not something eternal. It can erode, pause, and even end. Yet, brotherhood in foreign policy discourse refers to the closest relationship, trust, and reliance.

Ak Party's Foreign Policy

Ak Party (Justice and Development Party) was founded by Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and his friends, who were mainly adhering to former late Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan. When the party came to power in 2002, the domestic and foreign audience expected it to follow an Islamic agenda both internally and externally. However, unlike expectations, it spent great effort to be an EU member, thus it pressed on the EU to start negotiations for full membership, which indeed began in 2005. However,

¹³ Glenn H. Snyder, “Alliance Theory: A Neorealist First Cut,” *Journal of International Affairs*. 44, 1990.

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as the Greek Cyprus was accepted as a member despite refusing the Annan Plan and since Merkel and Sarkozy's governments opposed Turkey's membership, the Turkish government lost its hope about the EU.¹⁴ On the other hand, relations with the US deteriorated, as Turkey did not allow the US army to use its territories for the invasion of Iraq. In addition, relations with Israel were turbulent until Israeli forces killed 10 Turkish citizens in Mavi Marmara ship heading to Gaza to break the Israeli blockade. Since then, Turkish-Israeli relations are at their lowest level. While relations with the West were flavorless, the Erdogan-led government simultaneously improved relations with Middle Eastern and neighboring countries based on the 'zero problems with neighbors' principle, which was developed by Ahmet Davutoglu. The improved relations with Arab states were regarded as a 'shift of axis' or 'Neo-Ottomanism' by some analysts.

Before discussing these two terms, we should note that relations with the Arab and Western states worsened in the 2010s. The Arab Spring was a milestone for Turkey's relations with the Arab street. When uprisings erupted in December 2010, Turkey found itself in limbo. It had to choose either authoritarian leaders with whom it had good relations or people that wanted political participation. As it opted for people, authoritarian regimes distanced themselves from Turkey, leaving it alone with Qatar in the region.¹⁵ On the other hand, the Turkish government accused the West of supporting the Gezi protests of 2013 and the failed coup attempt on July 15, 2016. What is more, the US reluctance to sell Patriot missiles and support to SDF that Turkey sees as a PKK branch in Syria, and non-

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¹⁴ Mesut Özcan, "Turkish Foreign Policy under the AK Party," *Insight Turkey* 19, No. 2 (2017): 16.

¹⁵ Alexandros Zachariades, "Identity and Turkish Foreign Policy in the AK Party Era," *E-IR*, 21 March 2018, <https://www.e-ir.info/2018/03/21/identity-and-turkish-foreign-policy-in-the-ak-parti-era/> (Accessed December 15, 2020).

repatriation of wanted people were seen as a stand against Turkey by the Turkish government. Meanwhile, relations with Russia were developing, as it remained neutral regarding Turkish domestic politics.

Regarding discussions about the shift of axis, as Demirtaş and Balcı argue, more engagement with the Middle East does not mean a break with traditional Western-oriented foreign policy or a shift from secularism to Islamism but a shift to multi-dimensional foreign policy as the East was ignored by previous governments.¹⁶ In other words, it is not a change in axis but the inclusion of a new axis to the Turkish foreign policy. Such debates surfaced after then Foreign Minister and Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu mentioned giving a central role to Turkey so as to make it an influential regional power on ex-Ottoman geography. Davutoğlu's concepts like central state, rhythmic diplomacy, and historical and geographical depth serve this goal.¹⁷ His principles are pragmatist as well as based on the principle of neo-ottomanism. He and other Ak Party cadres tried/try to use historical relations with neighboring states that were once under Ottoman rule. Yet, Ak Party's foreign policy was/is not entirely Neo-Ottomanist because relations with the main Arab states were not at the desired level in the past and today. This is because either the Ak Party government did not want to revive the Ottoman legacy or they failed to do it. I argue that it is a desire, which the government is well aware that cannot be realized. Perhaps, they thought implementing it would not cost anything and might even bring some benefits. In other words, simply, it was better than never. On the other hand, Davutoğlu is an Islamist but also pro-Western that when he left Prime Ministry in 2016, Western politicians

¹⁶ Murat Yeşiltaş and Ali Balcı, *A Dictionary of Turkish Foreign Policy in the AK Party Era: A Conceptual Map* (Ankara: Stratejik Araştırmalar Merkezi, 2013), 29.

¹⁷ Ahmet Davutoğlu, *Stratejik Derinlik, [Strategic Depth]* (İstanbul: Küre Yayınları, 2001).

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and media had reacted against his resignation.¹⁸ In addition, getting closer to Russia clashes with the idea of neo-Ottomanism, since the Ottomans were not friends with Russians. My argument is that what forced Turkey to improve relations with Russia are the worsened relations with the West. If the West sends warm messages to Turkey, probably the Turkish government will welcome them.

Meanwhile, repairing relations with the Middle Eastern and other Muslim countries is not a project launched by Ak Party. Even leftist politician and former Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit had pointed out the significance of relations with Middle Eastern countries.¹⁹ Besides, former Prime Minister and President Turgut Özal had strived for increasing cooperation and having good relations with Arab and Muslim states in the 1980s. Even the Ecevit government's Foreign Minister Ismail Cem had similar policies in the late 1990s. What Davutoğlu did was to theorize and conceptualize the already existing practices of former governments. On the other hand, particularly right-wing and Islamic governments had/have a desire to link current foreign policy to the past, literally the Ottoman era, as they see Turkish history as glorious. They also blame Kemalist secular groups for cutting ties with the past for the sake of modernization, which they claim as nothing but the imitation of the West without any concrete physical (technological) development.

Overall, this study argues that there is more or less some Ottomanism and religion in Ak Party's foreign policy. Cadres of Erdogan-led government are generally pious and it will not be wrong to think that their faith affects their decisions. As Jervis argues, "it is often impossible to explain crucial

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¹⁸ John Hudson, "America Loses Its Man in Ankara," *Foreign Policy*, 5 May 2016, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2016/05/05/america-loses-its-man-in-ankara/> (Accessed 10 December 2020).

¹⁹ Ali Balcı, *Türkiye Dış Politikası: İlkeler, Aktörler ve Uygulamalar* (İstanbul: Alfa Yayınları, 2017).

decisions and policies without reference to the decision-makers' belief about the world and their images of others.”²⁰ This is the case for Erdoğan, his former aide Davutoğlu and other accomplices as well, and as this study argues, it is a usual behavior or foreign policy for all governments of the world. All states are proud of their history and have a foreign policy stemming from their past, religion, or interests. For instance, while Iran and Saudi Arabia give reference to religion in their policies, the US and the EU count on values like liberalism and democracy. This being the case, the discourse is also got affected by values. As will be discussed in the next section, it can be seen that Erdoğan and his team have referred to Islamic terms and commonalities in their speeches whether as a strategy to improve friendship or because the discourse reflects their real political identity. This study does not question their intention but tries to reveal how often statesmen use the word ‘kardeş’ (brother) in their statements in order to learn the role of faith in Ak Party’s foreign policy. More words could be examined but only ‘kardeş’ was analyzed in order to narrow the topic and since it is indeed a keyword for this study’s arguments.

Brotherhood in Ak Party’s Foreign Policy

For the Turkish Foreign Ministry, some countries are allies, some are strategic partners, some are friends but some are so special that they are called brother country (*kardeş ülke*). It should be noted that the word brother was used by pre-Ak Party era as well. Turkish Grand National Assembly’s (TBMM) archives show that almost all former Prime Ministers and other top rulers used the word brother for Muslim and Turkic countries. For instance, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk called Azerbaijan

²⁰ Robert Jervis, *Perceptions and Misperception in International Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), 28.

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as a brother country in one of his speeches in 1920.²¹ Fevzi Çakmak called Afghanistan and Iran as brother countries in 1921.²² İsmet İnönü called Iran a brother country in 1934.²³ He also called Algerians as brothers in 1962.²⁴ Interestingly, Şükrü Saracoğlu called Greeks as brothers in 1945.²⁵ Adnan Menderes called Iraq as a brother country in 1955.²⁶ Cemal Gürsel and Suat Hayri Ürgüplü did not use the word brother probably because their recorded speeches were not about foreign policy.²⁷ Nihat Erim called Pakistan and Bangladesh as brother country in one of his speeches in 1971.²⁸ In 1974, Bülent Ecevit proposed to improve good relations with Middle Eastern countries and Bosniacs, Albanians, Cypriots whom he called friends and brothers.²⁹ Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel calls Muslim and Turkish countries as brothers in 1975.³⁰ Prime Minister Bülend Ulusu called Muslim countries as brothers in one of hearings of the parliament in 1982.³¹ Ulusu was a secular Prime Minister and appointed by military junta after the military coup of 1980. Prime Minister Turgut Özal and his successor Yıldırım Akbulut also called Muslim and Turkic states as brother countries in parliamentary hearings.³² Overall, when TBMM's archives containing speeches of Turkish rulers, particularly Prime Ministers, are

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²¹ İrfan Neziroğlu ve Tuncer Yılmaz, *Başbakanlarımız ve Genel Kurul Çalışmaları* 8 Cilt (Ankara: TBMM Basımevi, 2014), Issue 1, 61.

²² Ibid, Cilt 1, 226.

²³ Ibid, Cilt (Issue) 2, 197.

²⁴ Ibid, Cilt (Issue) 2, 306.

²⁵ Ibid, Cilt (Issue) 3, 201.

²⁶ Ibid, Cilt (Issue) 4, 1955.

²⁷ Ibid, Cilt (Issue) 5.

²⁸ Ibid, Cilt (Issue) 7.

²⁹ Ibid, Cilt (Issue) 7, 469.

³⁰ Ibid, Cilt (Issue) 6, 143.

³¹ Ibid, Cilt (Issue) 8, 48.

³² Ibid, Cilt (Issue) 8, 271.

analyzed, it can be seen that almost all politicians from different parties called Turkic and Muslim countries as brother countries.

Regarding the Ak Party era, this study has gone over press releases and tweets of Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and personal tweets of incumbent minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu. It analyzed only those sources containing the word ‘kardeş’ or its English meaning ‘brother’. While analyzing brotherly statements, it also tried to find out the discourse against other countries, which does not include the word ‘brother’.

Beginning with some sample press releases, when then Foreign Minister Davutoğlu visited Azerbaijan in 2013, he defined Azerbaijan as a pre-eternal and eternal brother country.³³ Azerbaijan is indeed a special country for Turkey since it is not only a Muslim country but also a Turkic country whose language is well understood by Turks. Davutoğlu’s successor Feridun Sinirlioğlu also called Azerbaijan as a friend and brother country during his visit to Azerbaijan.³⁴ All speeches about Azerbaijan contain the word brother. What is more, Azerbaijan is called a twin brother in some statements. Moreover, when Minister Çavuşoğlu spoke in a meeting held for those countries gaining their independence from the Soviet Union, he used the term ‘friend and brother countries’ while addressing to ambassadors of Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Moldova, Ukraine, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Belarus, and Georgia. In the same speech, Çavuşoğlu differentiated among states and called Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan as brother countries when he praised the Turkish Association, an NGO

³³ Turkish MFA, “Dışişleri Bakanı Davutoğlu ‘Türkiye ve Azerbaycan Ezelden Ebede İki Kardeş Ülkedir,’” 2013a, <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/disisleri-bakani-davutoglu-turkiye-ve-azerbaycan-ezelden-ebede-iki-kardes-ulkedir.tr.mfa> (Accessed 8 December 2020).

³⁴ Turkish MFA, “Dışişleri Bakanı Feridun Sinirlioğlu’nun Bakü Ziyareti,” 2015, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/disisleri-bakani-feridun-sinirlioglu_nun-baku-ziyareti.tr.mfa (Accessed 15 December 2020).

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founded by Turkic countries.³⁵ It can be contended for the mentioned speech that brotherhood stems from being belonged to the same ethnic group and partly Islam religion. In another joint press meeting held together with Qatari Foreign Minister Muhammad Al-Thani, Çavuşoğlu calls Qatar as a friend and brother country. He also calls his counterpart ‘my brother Muhammad’ eight times. Al-Thani also calls Çavuşoğlu as ‘my brother Mevlüt’.³⁶ This time, the brotherhood between the two countries originates from the Islam religion.

More similar examples of brother-based speeches can be found on the Foreign Ministry’s website and social media accounts. If checked, it can be found that the Turkish Foreign Ministry calls Azerbaijan, Qatar, Tunisia, Sudan, Iran, Albania, Turkmenistan, Iraq, Kosovo, Libya, Pakistan, Mali, Guinea, Kazakhstan, Algeria, Afghanistan, Uzbekistan, Tunisia, Cameroon, Somalia, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain, Nigeria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Myanmar (Rakhine Muslims), Djibouti, Palestine, Chad, Kyrgyzstan, Malaysia, Mauritania, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Turkish Northern Cyprus Republic, Tajikistan, Indonesia, Bangladesh, Niger, Tatars of Ukraine, Akhaltsikhe Turks of Ukraine and Arab states in general as brother states (Turkish MFA Twitter Account (Turkish); Çavuşoğlu Twitter Account). All other Muslim countries can be included in this list as the word brother is consciously used for them. In general, the criterion for brotherhood seems to be (1) ethnicity and

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³⁵ Turkish MFA, “Dışişleri Bakanı Sayın Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu’nun Türkiye Cumhuriyeti ile Dost ve Kardeş Ülkeler Arasında Diplomatik İlişkilerin Kurulmasının 25. Yıldönümü Vesilesiyle Düzenlenen Resepsiyonda Yaptığı Konuşma,” 2017a, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/disisleri-bakani-sayin-mevlut-cavusoglu_nun-turkiye-cumhuriyeti-ile-dost-ve-kardes-ulkeler-arasinda-diplomatik-iliskilerin.tr.mfa (Accessed 12 December 2020).

³⁶ Turkish MFA, “Dışişleri Bakanı Sayın Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu’nun Katar Dışişleri Bakanı Muhammed El-Sani ile Ortak Basın Toplantısı,” 2017b, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/disisleri-bakani-sayin-mevlut-cavusoglu_nun-katar-disisleri-bakaniyla-ortak-basin-toplantisi.tr.mfa (Accessed 12 December 2020).

(2) religion. If a country or a community is Turkic in origin, it is regarded as a brother. For example, the Turkic people Gagauzes living in Moldova are called brothers despite that they are Eastern Orthodox Christians.³⁷ In addition, Hungary is also listed as a brother country. In a tweet as a response to Hungarian Ambassador to Ankara, who calls Turkey a friend and brother country, the Turkish Foreign Ministry describes Hungary as a friend and brother country, too.³⁸ Hungarians are Turkic people whose ancestors are believed to be Huns as Turkey's Turks. The further revival of Hungary's being Turkic people does not go back much in time. It happened, particularly in recent decades. Previously, both countries were aware of their ethnic origin but they were distant from each other due to ideological and religious reasons.

Meanwhile, the only exception regarding ethnicity and religion seems to be Ukraine. When Minister Çavuşoğlu visited Ukraine in December 2020, he thanked 'friend and brother Ukraine' for sending 1 million tourists to his hometown, Antalya.³⁹ Probably either Çavuşoğlu's tongue slipped or he personally sees Ukraine as a brother country since there is no such call in Ministry's press releases. However, it is a fact that Turkey and Ukraine are indeed good friends. Regarding religion, being a Muslim country is enough to be called a brother as Holy Qur'an says all Muslims are brothers (Hucurat, 10). Such brotherhood is not specific to Muslims.

³⁷ Turkish MFA Twitter Account (Turkish), "#Dibdavutoglu: Gökoğuz Yeri ve Gagavuzlar Moldova ile Aramızdaki Köprüdür. Gökoğuz'u Yalnız Bırakmayacağız. Ebediyete Kadar Kardeş Kalacağız," 13 May 2012, https://twitter.com/TC_Disisleri/status/201608774555942912?s=20 (Accessed 15 December 2020).

³⁸ Turkish MFA Twitter Account (Turkish), "Dost ve Kardeş Macaristan'a Tebrik Mesajı için Teşekkür Ediyoruz," 29 October 2019, https://twitter.com/TC_Disisleri/status/1189266150380716038?s=20 (Accessed 23 December 2020).

³⁹ Mehmet Ali Dim, "Dışişleri Bakanımız @MevlutCavusoglu Kiev'de konuştu: Pandemiye rağmen bu yıl 1 milyon Ukraynalı turisti ağırladık. Bir Antalyalı olarak bu konuda dost kardeş Ukrayna halkına özellikle teşekkür ederim," 18 December 2020, (Accessed 3 January 2020), <https://twitter.com/MehmetAliDim/status/1339955076685819905>

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Jews, Christians, and other people believing in other religions call each other brothers. It is also not specific to Turkey. Politicians of other Muslim countries call each other brothers as well.

On the other hand, brotherhood may pause on some occasions. For example, the Turkish Foreign Ministry's archives show that Davutoğlu and UAE Foreign Minister Abdullah Bin Zayed Al Nahyan were calling each other as brothers and their countries as brother states.⁴⁰ The last brotherly addressing to each other goes back to October 16, 2016, when UAE Foreign Minister Al-Nahyan visited Turkey. Both ministers called each other brothers.⁴¹ However, when some leaked e-mails of the UAE ambassador to Washington revealed that the UAE supported the failed coup attempt on July 15, 2016, brotherhood turned into hostility. Since then, the discourse has changed and the Turkish Foreign Ministry has condemned UAE's anti-Turkey policies and called this country hypocritical, terrorism supporter, destabilizer of the region, and so on. Turkey is very disturbed by UAE's support to Sisi in Egypt, Haftar in Libya, and Assad in Syria. When a Turkish missile system was attacked by UAE fighters in Libya in 2020, the Turkish Defense Minister said they would take revenge at an appropriate time and place. Consequently, the UAE is no longer a brother country due to hostilities as of 2021. However, in case relations are repaired, probably it will again become a brother country. On the other hand, as per the logic in the discourse of the Turkish Foreign Ministry, the UAE population is still a brother.

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⁴⁰ Turkish MFA, "Sayın Bakanımızın BAE Dışişleri Bakanı Şeyh Abdullah Bin Zayed Al Nahyan ile Ortak Basın Toplantısı," 2011, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/sayin-bakanimizin-bae-disisleri-bakani-seyh-abdullah-bin-zayed-al-nahyan-ile-ortak-basin-toplantisi_-5-temmuz-2011_-ankara.tr.mfa (Accessed 7 December 2020).

⁴¹ Turkish MFA, "Dışişleri Bakanı Sayın Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu'nun BAE Dışişleri Bakanı Sayın Şeyh Abdullah bin Zayed Al Nahyan ile Ortak Basın Toplantısı," 2016a, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/disisleri-bakani-sayin-cavusoglu-ile-bae-disisleri-bakani-sayin-seyh-abdullah-bin-zayed-al-nahyan_in-ortak-basin-toplantisi.tr.mfa (Accessed 12 December 2020).

Such a change in discourse is apparent for other Muslim countries, with which Turkey has a rift. For instance, relations with Egypt peaked during the Morsi government but when Al Sisi overthrew him, the word brother was used for Egyptian people only. In other words, the Sisi regime was differentiated from the Egyptian people. Turkey opposed the military coup led by Abdarrahan Al Sisi, and both countries remained on opposite sides concerning the Middle Eastern issues. On the other hand, the Al Sisi government is disturbed by Turkey's support of the Muslim Brotherhood. The discourse against the Assad regime also changed over time. Before the Arab Spring erupted, Syrian leader Bashar Assad was called 'Brother Assad,' and Syria was described as the 'second home'.⁴² However, when the Assad regime chose to fight his people instead of making reforms in the political system, Assad was called with the words like 'dictator,' 'murderer of 600.000 people,' 'illegitimate,' etc.⁴³ Another country with which Turkey has problems is Saudi Arabia. As both countries were on opposite sides during the Arab Spring, relations were in an idle position. Yet, when Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi was murdered in Saudi Arabia's Istanbul consulate, the Turkish government was angered and held Crown Prince Muhammad Bin Salman accountable for the murder. However, while President Erdoğan blamed Crown Prince, he never used negative words about King Salman. Therefore, Turkey targeted only Bin Salman and separated the King and Saudi people. It seems that when there are political problems with Muslim countries, Turkey prefers not to use the word brother or use it only for the mentioned country's population.

⁴² Sabah, "Suriye İkinci Evimizdir," 23 December 2009, https://www.sabah.com.tr/gundem/2009/12/23/suriye_ikinci_evimizdir (Accessed 30 November 2020).

⁴³ Turkish MFA, "Dışışleri Bakanı Sayın Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu'nun Lübnan Dışışleri Bakanı Gibran Bassil ile Gerçekleştirdiği Ortak Basın Toplantısı," 2016b, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/disisleri-bakani-sayin-mevlut-cavusoglu_nun-lubnan-disisleri-bakani-gibran-bassil-ile-gerceklestirdigi-ortak-basin-toplantisi_-2.tr.mfa (Accessed 13 December 2020).

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As explained above, Muslim and Turkic countries are certainly brothers of Turkey. What about non-Muslims? To give some examples, when the Turkish Foreign Ministry celebrated the national day of Czechia, it described that country as a friend and an ally, probably because of good relations and Czechia's NATO membership.⁴⁴ The same account uses terms of friend and ally for Hungary, too. Remember that it also used the word brother for Hungary above. In addition, Poland is seen as a friend and strategic partner, Romania and Latvia as a friend and an ally, the Philippines as a friend, NATO allies as friends and allies, and the US as an ally, friend and strategic ally. When other countries make statements about Turkey, they use similar words (friend, ally, strategic partner, etc.) since such terms have become *sine qua non* in diplomatic discourse. In fact, Spanish Foreign Minister Jose Manuel Garcia-Margallo said 'brother country Turkey' in a visit to Turkey in 2016 but it should rather be seen as an exception and ad-hoc use,⁴⁵ because Spain does not call other countries as brothers. When the Spanish Foreign Ministry's website is checked, it can be seen that no country is described as a brother. Meanwhile, among all non-Muslim countries, South Korea has a special relationship with Turkey. As the Turkish army fought alongside South Koreans with 21.212 soldiers in 1952 and left 966 casualties during the war, South Korean people have great sympathy for Turks. For example, South Korean newspaper *Donga* called Turks as 'blood brothers' in one of its issues published in November

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⁴⁴ Turkish MFA Twitter Account (Turkish), "Dost ve Müttefik Çekya'nın Milli Günü Kutlu Olsun. İkili İlişkilerimizi ve Güçlü İşbirliğimizi Her Alanda Geliştireceğiz," 28 December 2020, https://twitter.com/TC_Disisleri/status/1321445253040275462?s=20 (Accessed 23 December 2020).

⁴⁵ Turkish MFA, "Dışişleri Bakanı Sayın Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu'nun İspanya Dışişleri Bakanı José Manuel García-Margallo ile Ortak Basın Toplantısı," 2016c, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/disisleri-bakani-sayin-mevlut-cavusoglu_nun-istanbul-disisleri-bakani-jose-manuel-garc_a-margallo-ile-ortak-basin-toplantisi_-7-e.tr.mfa (Accessed 11 December 2020).

2011.⁴⁶ Currently, Turkey's worst relations are with Israel. Erdogan-led Turkish governments staunchly opposed Israel's occupation of Palestinian lands. When 10 Turkish people were killed in a ship heading to Gaza to break the blockade, Turkey was almost about to declare war on Israel. War did not happen but relations were never recovered. Turkey's narrative was quite hard against the Israeli state. For instance, 'the occupier' and 'terror state' were among the most used words by the ruling elites.⁴⁷

Brotherhood in Other Countries' Foreign Policy Discourse

If one seeks the same discourse for other countries, it can be seen that the narrative of brotherhood can rarely be found in diplomatic statements of non-Muslim countries. This study has analyzed several websites belonging to foreign ministries of other countries and some international organizations to seek brotherhood narrative. For example, the French Foreign Ministry never uses the word *frère* (brother) for other countries.⁴⁸ They mostly use the word 'partner' for friendly countries including ex-colonies. International Organization of La Francophonie (Organisation Internationale de la Francophonie) also does not use the word brother for member states.⁴⁹ On the other hand, while the UK Foreign Ministry

⁴⁶ Turkish Embassy in Seoul, "Donga Gazetesi: Kan Kardeş Ülke Kore'nin Sıcak Desteklerine Teşekkür Ederiz," 25 November 11, <http://seul.be.mfa.gov.tr/Mission/ShowSpeech/1851> (Accessed December 12, 2020).

⁴⁷ Turkish MFA, "Dışişleri Bakanı Sayın Ahmet Davutoğlu'nun ABD Dışişleri Bakanı John Kerry İle Ortak Basın Toplantısı," 2013b, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/disisleri-bakani-sayin-ahmet-davutoglu_nun-abd-disisleri-bakani-john-kerry-ile-ortak-basin-toplantisi_-1-mart-2013_-ankara.tr.mfa (Accessed 10 December 2020).

⁴⁸ Diplomatie, "Search Section," 24 April 2021, https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/spip.php?page=recherche&lang=en&tri=points&id_rubrique=&recherche=brother (Accessed 24 April 2021). Journalist Fatih Karakaya helped for search in French language in this website.

⁴⁹ Francophonie, "Search Section," 23 April 2021, <https://www.francophonie.org/> (Accessed 24 April 2021). Journalist Fatih Karakaya helped for search in French language in this website

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does not use the word brother in its readouts, the Secretary-General of Commonwealth organization calls people of 54 member states as brothers.⁵⁰ The US Secretary of State does not call close countries as brothers, either. It generally uses words such as partner, ally and friend.⁵¹ Regarding China, the Chinese-Pakistani relationship is termed as 'Iron Brothers' by officials of both states. What is more, China is asking Afghanistan and Nepal to be iron brothers like Pakistan.⁵² It seems that China calls its best allies as brothers. Unlike aforementioned countries, the word brother can be found more in Russian Foreign Ministry's statements. For example, Belarus is a brother country to Russia.⁵³ In addition, Russian Foreign Ministry calls Yugoslavia and Serbia as 'Slavic brothers'.⁵⁴ Thus, it can be contented that an ethnic-based brotherhood is apparent in Russia's discourse.

As can be seen, non-Muslim countries generally do not see each other as brothers except for some, which base their brotherhood on ethnic

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⁵⁰ The Commonwealth, "Search Results for Brother," 23 April 2021, <https://thecommonwealth.org/search?keywords=brother&op=Search> (Accessed 23 April 2021).

⁵¹ US Department of State, "Search Results for Brother Country," 24 April 2021, https://findit.state.gov/search?affiliate=dos_stategov&page=3&query=brother+country&sort_by=&utf8=%E2%9C%93 (Accessed 24 April 2021).

⁵² Times Now, "China Asks Afghanistan, Nepal to be Like 'Iron Brother' Pakistan at a Four-Country Meet," 28 July 2020, <https://www.timesnownews.com/international/article/china-asks-afghanistan-nepal-to-be-like-iron-brother-pakistan-at-a-four-country-meet/628123> (Accessed 25 April 2021).

⁵³ Russian Foreign Ministry, "Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov's Remarks and Answers to Questions at the Territory of Meanings on the Klyazma National Education Youth Forum, Moscow Region, Solnechnogorsk, August 23, 2020," 23 August 2020, https://www.mid.ru/en/web/guest/meropriyatiya_s_uchastiem_ministra/-/asset_publisher/xK1BhB2bUjd3/content/id/4295201 (Accessed 24 April 2021).

⁵⁴ Russian Foreign Ministry Twitter Account, "Lavrov: #Soviet Soldiers And Fighters from The People's Liberation Army Of #Yugoslavia Heroically Fought Shoulder to Shoulder, Shedding Their Blood for the Freedom and Independence of the #Slavic Brothers," 16 December 2020, https://twitter.com/mfa_russia/status/1338968510542835718 (Accessed 24 April 2021).

affiliation. Perhaps, China might be an exception since it sees brotherhood as a level beyond friendship. It seems that the Chinese accept a country as a brother on the condition that it is a long-term firm ally.

Regarding Muslim countries other than Turkey, they underline brotherhood in their narratives as well. As some examples among many, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar and Kazakhstan call Muslim and Arab states as brotherly countries while calling non-Muslims as friendly countries.⁵⁵ On the other hand, Egyptians call African countries as brothers, too.⁵⁶ They also use the word brother for Copts as well. It can be said that other Muslim countries accept Muslim states and those states with the same ethnic origin as brothers. However, as in the case of Turkey, brotherly terms are abandoned temporarily when relations are at low-level.

Brotherhood in Practice

The reflection of Turkey's brotherhood discourse can be traced to its international political and aid activities. Lastly, the Turkish state gave direct support to its 'twin' brother Azerbaijan to retake the Karabakh

⁵⁵ UAE Foreign Ministry, "Search Section," 23 April 2021, <https://www.mofaic.gov.ae/search?query=brother&page=1> (Accessed 23 April 2021); Qatari Foreign Ministry, "Search Results for Brother," 25 April 2021, <https://www.mofa.gov.qa/en/search?indexCatalogue=mofasite&searchQuery=brother&wordsMode=AllWords> (Accessed 25 April 2021); Saudi Foreign Ministry Twitter Account, "FM Prince Faisal bin Farhan: "The Kingdom's Humanitarian Assistance to Our Syrian Brothers Amounted to About \$ 1.15 Billion," 6 July 2020, <https://twitter.com/KSAMofaEN/status/1280114547907596289?s=20> (Accessed 24 April 2021); Prime Ministry of Kazakhstan, "Celebration of Kurban Aid Started in Astana," 21 August 2018, <https://www.primeminister.kz/en/news/17005> (Accessed 24 April 2021).

⁵⁶ Twitter Account of Egypt Embassy in Addis Ababa, "President Al-Sisi Congratulated His Brother #DRC President-Elect #FelixTshisekedi @fatshi13 and Welcomed Him 2 the community of #Africa leaders. Promising Future of Democracy & Prosperity Awaits the Great People of #DRC," 22 January 2019, <https://twitter.com/EgyptAbaba/status/1087460975257755648?s=20> (Accessed 24 April 2021).

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region back. Military analysts say that the Armenian army had to withdraw from Karabakh due to massive attacks of Turkey-made armed drones, namely Bayraktar TB2. Turkish F-16 jets were also based in Azerbaijan for a likely attack. What made Turkey give a blank check to Azerbaijan is ethnic brotherhood rather than religion since the majority of Azerbaijani people adhere to Shia theology. On the other hand, Turkey's support for Pakistan (and vice versa) is based on religion. While Pakistan has shown its support to Turkey in all conflicts, Turkish governments have sided with Pakistan against India, which makes the latter uneasy. Moreover, Turkey's relations with Israel have mostly been at a low level, particularly during the Ak Party era, due to Palestine. Turkish governments have opposed Israel's occupation and torture of Palestinians perhaps more than Arab states. Due to Ak Party's Islamic character, Turkey's condemnation of Israel was harder than previous governments. The strife between the two countries also led to anti-Turkey campaigns launched by the Israeli lobby in Western countries, particularly in the US. Furthermore, the Turkish state and people were against the US involvement in Middle Eastern politics due to religious ties with regional people. In addition, Turkey raised its voice for Bosnians and Kosovars against Serbians, Arakan Muslims in Myanmar, Chechens in Russia, and Islamophobic events, publications, and attacks across the world.

In terms of foreign aid, the Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TIKA) helps any country in need but does more for Muslim countries. For instance, as of 2019, TIKA had 52 coordination offices worldwide and 40 of them were either Muslim or had a Muslim minority.⁵⁷ In addition, all top ten countries receiving aid are Muslims, namely

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⁵⁷ TIKA, "2019 Annual Report," 2020, <https://www.tika.gov.tr/upload/sayfa/publication/2019/Kalk%C4%B1nma%20Yard%C4%B1mlar%C4%B1%202019.pdf> (Accessed 15 December 2020).

Afghanistan, Somalia, Bangladesh, Sudan, Yemen, Niger, Djibouti, Chad, Myanmar (Arakan Muslims), and Guinea.⁵⁸ Yet, it should be noted that these Muslim countries are indeed poor and get aid from Western countries as well. Moreover, there are military equipment donations to brotherly and friendly countries like Albania, North Macedonia, Tunisia, Somalia, Azerbaijan, Pakistan, and so on. Therefore, it can be contended that Turkey's foreign policy discourse complies with practice. In other words, Turkey looks after its 'brothers' and friends in proportion to its fiscal, economic, and political strength.

Should such positive discrimination be praised or condemned? There might be various and clashing answers to this question but this study argues that it is quite a natural strategy to categorize states as per their closeness. Besides, such classification is not unique to the Turkish Foreign Ministry and generally to Turkey. For instance, for Israel, all Jews around the world have special importance due to their religion and ethnicity. Israeli rulers do not avoid calling themselves a Jewish state. If this is the definition they like then they are free to use it. Moreover, the EU is supposed to be established on a Judeo-Christian tradition though some scholars deny it. Even if assuming that this tradition does not (or no longer) exist, the EU has some values like democracy, geography, and liberalism that make member states friends, like-minded, or ally. On the other hand, the US believes that it is a chosen nation that will bring peace to the world.⁵⁹ In addition, particularly the Evangelist impact on Republican administrations is apparently shaping the US foreign policy. Regarding China, it has unwritten categorizations for states. For example,

⁵⁸ Ibid, 27.

⁵⁹ Michael Colebrook, "Whose National Interest? Which Foreign Policy?", Real Clear Defense, 7 February 2020, https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2020/02/07/whose_national_interest_which_foreign_policy_115030.html (Accessed 27 December 2020).

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as an anonymous diplomat said, its relations with close friends like Pakistan are called as ‘all-weather partnership’ or ‘iron brothers’.

Therefore, it is not weird for Turkey to name states as per its relations based on religion, ethnicity, interests, geography, history, or culture. This strategy will be dangerous only when it is used for malicious ends. For instance, if a terrorist organization or a thug country is supported just because of commonalities, it may be worrying but if it is done for improving relations, then the categorization is benign as well as value-added. A former Turkish consul general was asked about the brotherhood discourse. He said that “there are no written rules about how to address a country. It is on the discretion of the concerning department.” He added that they call Muslim countries brothers because they are brothers. He declined that non-Muslim countries are negatively discriminated against, arguing that there are non-Muslim countries with which they have better relations. Turkey indeed has good friends like Ukraine, which they can prefer to, for example, the UAE.

On the other hand, two aspects are conspicuous in Turkey’s discourse. First, brotherhood in foreign policy is a policy as well as a discourse for mainly right-wing and conservative governments. Secular and leftist governments generally distance themselves from religion-based foreign policy. For example, Turkey became a member of The Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) quite late, arguing that membership is not compliant with the principle of *laicite* (secularism). Hence, if Ak Party is replaced by a secular party like the People’s Republican Party (CHP), the discourse will change or some words like ‘brother’ may have a senseless meaning. Therefore, the current discourse may not disappear totally but less narrated. Second, Turkey’s reactions in some conflicts are a bit sentimental, particularly when the oppressor or the victim is a Muslim country. For instance, when a Muslim country like Syria tortures its people, the Turkish government rightly condemns it and cuts all diplomatic

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relations. Yet, when a non-Muslim country applies violence against a Muslim country or community, the reaction is harsher even though the violent actions have a little scale. Whereas, torture is torture regardless of the torturer. In addition, the oppression perpetrated by Muslim dictators should hurt more as they are targeting their Muslim population/brothers.

Conclusion

This study has analyzed the word brother in Turkish Foreign Ministry's press releases, Twitter account, incumbent minister Mevlüt **Çavuşoğlu's** Twitter account, and some other Turkish governmental websites. The study aimed to unveil for which countries the word *kardeş* (brother) is used. As the remark of the best friends, the word brother is put before the names of either Muslim or Turkic countries. In other words, Muslim and Turkic countries are natural allies, friends, strategic partners but they are also like real brothers. Such discourse stems from Turkish and Islamic traditions, according to which, while a Turk is a brother due to ethnic reasons, a Muslim is also a brother as Qur'an orders so. Turkey seems to prefer the same discourse used by people in its foreign policy. However, words have a reflection in real politics as well. The Turkish government has supported Turkic and Muslim countries at the expense of its good relations with other countries. For instance, Turkey's attitudes toward Israel, India, and the US are shaped by the interests of its brother countries, namely Palestine, Pakistan, or generally the Middle Eastern states. On the other hand, it should be noted that brotherhood became more meaningful and further wielded during the Ak Party government. In case a non-Islamic government comes to power, the discourse might change despite not dramatically. Whether non-brother countries misunderstand such categorization needs another research but it can be contended that warm words lead to warmer relations. Therefore, Turkey's brotherly foreign policy does not look malicious but rather beneficial.

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